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INTRODUCTION
The unique nature of computer software has made the application
of traditional copyright law to programs a difficult task.1 The
difficulty arises because, although computer programs are considered
literary works,2 they differ from traditional copyrighted materials in
that they have utility; they produce a result. Congress recognized the
utility of computer programs when it amended the Copyright Act of
1976 to define explicitly the term "computer program."3 In addition,
computer software has both literal and non-literal aspects.4 Although
1. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 828 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin,J.,
concurring) ("Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle
whose pieces do not quite fit."), aff'd by an equally divided court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per
curiam); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir.
1994) (noting that court decisions concerning copyrightability of computer software are in state
of "creative ferment"); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir.
1992) (noting that application of copyright law to computer software is "attempt to fit the
proverbial square peg in a round hole"); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protectionfor Computer
Software 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (1987) (stating that computer software does not fit neatly
into traditional intellectual property law);Joseph T. Verdesca, Jr., Copyrighting the User Interface:
Too Much Protection , 45 SW. LJ. 1047, 1079 (1991) (arguing that copyright law does not take into
account unique nature of computer software).
2. See 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (1994) (setting forth illustrative list of works that, if original, merit
copyright protection). First on the list are "literary works," which are defined as "works, other
than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers or other verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia." Id. § 101. Literal aspects of computer software code traditionally have been considered
literary works for purposes of copyright protection. See infra note 5 (discussing brief legislative
history of characterization of computer programs as literary works).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining computer program as a set of statements or instructions
to be used in a computer to bring about a certain result); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54-62 (D. Mass. 1990) (discussing thoroughly utilitarian nature
of computer software and how it affects analysis of copyrightability of software); Aram Dobalian,
Copyright Protection for the Non-Literal Elements of Computer Programs: The Need for Compulsory
Licensing, 15 WHrrIER L. REV. 1019, 1019 (1994) (noting that, due to unusual nature of
computer software, copyright may not be most appropriate area of law to apply).
4. SeeMenell, supranote 1, at 1334 (noting that literal aspects of computer software consist
of program's "object code" and "source code"). The source code is what the program's creator
types in a computer language tlat people can read and understand. See id. The source code
is then translated into a form (binary language) that the computer can understand. See id.
The non-literal aspects of computer software include all portions of the program other than
the source and object codes. See Matthew P. Larvick, Questioning the Necessity of Copyright Protection
for Software Interfaces, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 189. The non-literal aspects include the overall
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Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976 to include explicitly
computer programs,5 courts have struggled to determine the
optimum level of copyright protection for computer software.6 The
amount of protection afforded to the non-literal aspects of computer
software has varied in recent years from broad coverage to practically
no coverage at all.7
Recognizing the problems involved in applying copyright law to
computer software, several authors have proposed sui generis systems
of protection for computer software.' These systems attempt to
organization of a program, the structure of a program's command system, the program's flow
charts, and the screen presentation. See AltaI 982 F.2d at 702 (noting that non-literal
components include flow charts, organization, parameter lists, and macros);Johnson Controls,
Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing non-literal
components of computer program as structure, sequence, organization, and user interface);
Paperback Softwar 740 F. Supp. at 42-44 (listing non-literal aspects of computer software as
overall organization, structure of command system, and screen presentation).
This Commentfocuses on the debate regarding the amount of copyright protection necessary
for non-literal aspects of computer software. The literal aspects of computer software, the
source and object codes, traditionally have been granted copyright protection. See infra note 6
(listing cases in which courts granted copyright protection to literal aspects of software).
The terms "software" and "program" have become synonymous in the computer industry. For
purposes of this Comment, the terms are used interchangeably.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Copyright Act of 1976 did not mention computer programs
explicitly, but it was clear from legislative history that Congress intended computer programs to
be included in the term "literary works." See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary works' ... includes ... computer
programs."). To clarify any ambiguity, however, in 1980 Congress amended the Copyright Act
to include computer programs explicitly. See Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980)
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
6. Courts consistently have held that the literal aspects of computer software are
copyrightable if original. See, e.g., Alta4 982 F.2d at 702 (noting that it is well settled that source
and object codes are copyrightable); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that it is well established that copyright law protects program's
source and object codes); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that copyright law covers source and object codes); Paperback
Software 740 F. Supp. at 45 (stating that literal manifestations of computer software are
copyrightable).
Courts are split, however, on whether copyright law protects the non-literal aspects of
computer software. This Comment addresses the copyrightability of the non-literal aspects. See
infra Parts IA-C (discussing issue of copyrightability of non-literal aspects of computer software).
7. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239 (noting that copyright protection extends beyond literal
aspects of computer program); Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 77 (holding that copyright
protection "clearly and unequivocally" should extend to original, non-literal aspects of computer
software). But see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
non-literal aspect of Lotus' program is uncopyrightable), afl'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S.
Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th
Cir. 1994) (stating that non-literal aspects are afforded "thin" protection from copyright
infringement), cert. denieA, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Vance F. Brown, Comment, The Incompatiblity of Copyright and Computer Software,
66 N.C.L. REV. 977, 1007 (1988) (advocating "marketplace system of protection for software"
that does not rely on copyright law); Irwin R. Gross, A New Framework for Software Protection:
Distinguishing Between Interactive and Non-Interactive Aspects of Computer Programs, 20 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 107, 179 (1994) (proposing "soft-right" system of protection for non-
literal aspects of computer software); Virginia I Lyons, Note, Carrying Copyright Too Far The
Inadequacy of the Current System of Protection for Computer Programs, HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ.
1996] LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. BORLAND INTERNATIONAL 153
balance the competing interests of the computer software industry
against those of its consumers by formulating legal protection without
the use of existing copyright law.9
Underlying the battle over software copyright protection is the
question of possible anticompetitive behavior by computer program
copyright owners. In several recent copyright cases, courts have
applied an antitrust analysis when considering the behavior of the
software copyright owners."0 The courts in these cases did not
consider the traditional factors used in antitrust determinations, a'
thereby reserving traditional antitrust analysis 2 for traditional
antitrust situations." Therefore, when a software copyright owner
enforces its copyright in an "anticompetitive" manner such that it
81, 96 (1989) (suggesting new system of protection for computer software not based on
copyright law); Menell, supra note 1, at 1371 (promoting system of legal protection for computer
software that would last only short time); John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis IntellectualProperty
Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 997, 1032 (1992) (proposing sui generis
legislative plan based on importance of computer software industry to national economy);
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2365 (1994) (advocating market-oriented approach to legal protection of
computer software).
9. See supra note 8 (naming authors who advocate sui genefis systems of protection for
computer software).
10. See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1185-86 (1st
Cir. 1994) (relying on antitrust principles to decide copyright infringement case); MAI Sys.
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,523, 26 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding preliminary injunction preventing defendant Peak, a computer service organization,
from using copyrighted software to service plaintiff's computers, effectively eliminating
defendant as competitor in computer maintenance market); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds,
911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (analyzing defendant's conduct with eye toward its
anticompetitive nature).
11. The elements of a traditional section 2 Sherman Act antitrust violation were discussed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966):
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.
Id. Courts that have relied on a quasi-antitrust analysis have not examined these factors. See
infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. For a discussion of this misapplication of antitrust law,
see Anthony L. Clapes, Software, Copyright and Competition: The Use of Antitrust Theory to Undercut
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, inINTELLECrUAL PROPERTYANTrrRUST 1995, at 553 (PLI
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Practice Course Handbook Series No. G4-3942,
1995).
12. An example of this type of situation, known as "tying," is one in which a seller of a
product will sell the copyrighted product only if the buyer also buys a different product offered
by the seller. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992)
(defining "tying" arrangement as "'an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he
will not purchase that product from any other supplier' (quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958))).
13. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (noting that "certain tying
arrangements pose unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per
se'"); Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that if
tying arrangement is shown to restrain competition unreasonably it is illegal).
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stifles competition, courts have relied on antitrust principles without
performing the requisite analysis under antitrust law.14 This Com-
ment focuses on how courts have addressed the "anticompetitive"
behavior of computer software copyright owners, and on how this
analysis has affected the level of copyright protection courts afford
computer software.
In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,15 the Fourth Circuit prevent-
ed Lasercomb, the owner of a valid and enforceable copyright, from
recovering damages from an infringer because the court believed that
Lasercomb "use [d] its copyright in a manner adverse to the public
policy embodied in copyright law."i" This defense to copyright in-
fringement is known as the "copyright misuse" doctrine.' Applying
this doctrine, the court held that Lasercomb used its copyright to
control competition through the use of anticompetition clauses in its
copyright licensing agreements.' 8
Contrary to Lasercomb, however, other courts that have considered
the anticompetitive behavior of copyright owners have held that the
owners merely were enforcing their copyrights as they were entitled
to do under the Copyright Act. 9 Thus, a tension exists between the
right of the copyright owner to enforce a legally valid copyright and
the right of the computer software industry to be protected from the
anticompetitive practices of monopolistic industry leaders.
In addition to the threat of possible anticompetitive acts by
copyright owners, several authors have expressed concern that
granting copyrights for computer software confers monopoly status on
the copyright recipients due to the nature of software and of the
14. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of use of quasi-
antitrust analysis in computer software copyright cases).
15. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
16. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
17. See id. at 976 (finding that copyright misuse is valid defense to infringement). In
Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit did not analyze the requisite Sherman Act factors. See supra note
11 (delineating Sherman Act factors). The court in Lasercomb held that "a [copyright] misuse
need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an
infringement action." Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
18. See id.; see also infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (summarizing court's rejection
of Lasercomb's use of its copyright agreement).
19. SeeData Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that plaintiff's unilateral refusal to license its copyright is presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers); Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc.
v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 370 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's selective
licensing of its copyright is not copyright misuse, but rather is enforcement of its copyright that
it legally is entitled to do); Lucasarts Entertainment Co. v. Humongous Entertainment Co., 870
F. Supp. 285, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that copyright owner has "untrammeled right" to
decide whether to license its copyright and to dictate terms of such license); see also infra notes
93-125 and accompanying text (reviewing other cases involving alleged copyright misuse).
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software industry.2" These authors contend that computer software
should receive limited copyright protection to prevent monopolization
by the first entrant into the market. 1 Other commentators argue,
conversely, for broad software copyright protection.22 Moreover, not
only is there a conflict regarding what is the proper conduct of
computer software copyright owners, but a conflict also exists
regarding whether computer software copyrights should be issued at
all. Thus, any solution to the problem of copyright protection for
computer software must balance the interests of copyright owners
against the concerns of the software industry.
In his concurrence in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Internation-
al,2 Judge Boudin suggests a new approach to copyright protection
of computer software.24 Boudin first echoed the sentiments of
several commentators, stating that granting a copyright for the Lotus
spreadsheet program would confer monopoly status on Lotus because
copyright protection would prevent competitors from entering the
market with similar, competing products.2" Lotus had sued Borland
after Borland allegedly copied Lotus' menu command hierarchy into
its own competing spreadsheet program." Judge Boudin argued
that Borland's use of Lotus' program could be considered a "privi-
leged use" because Borland was attempting to allow former Lotus
users to utilize their knowledge of the Lotus program while enjoying
the advantages of Borland's product.2 In other words, Borland was
not trying to take advantage of Lotus' advances but rather was
attempting to achieve compatibility2 between its product and
20. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (describing concerns of some
commentators that grant of computer software copyright confers monopoly status on copyright
owner).
21. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' view that
software should receive limited protection).
22. See infra notes 148-66 and accompanying text (noting arguments for stronger copyright
protection for computer software to protect interests of software developers).
23. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Cour 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per
curiam).
24. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that "privileged use doctrine" be applied to computer software), af/'d
by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam).
25. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring) (opining that granting copyright to non-literal aspects
of Lotus' program will confer monopoly status to Lotus); see also infra notes 182-87 and
accompanying text (discussingJudge Boudin's fear that granting copyrights to Lotus would lead
to monopolization of market).
26. See Lotus, 49 F.Sd at 809.
27. See id. at 821 (BoudinJ., concurring).
28. Compatibility is one of the main reasons cited in support of the argument that
copyright protection for non-literal aspects should be limited. A computer user can transfer files
between compatible programs but not between incompatible programs. Standardization occurs
when all programs of a given category are compatible so that users can transfer files freely
between competing programs. See GerardJ. Lewis,Jr., Comment, Lotus Development Corp. v.
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Lotus'.29 Thus, underJudge Boudin's proposed alternative, comput-
er software copyright owners would be required to allow their
competitors limited use of their products to ensure compatibility
between competing software and to prevent monopolization of the
software market3 ° In essence, Judge Boudin's proposal would form
a type of limited compulsory licensing scheme."
This Comment analyzes Judge Boudin's proposal for a new
computer software copyright doctrine in light of the anticompetitive
practices of copyright owners and the idea that the computer software
copyright itself can create a monopoly.3 2 Part I reviews some major
computer software cases involving copyright and antitrust principles
that have shaped the law leading to the First Circuit's decision in
Lotus and outlines the traditional arguments for and against granting
software copyrights.3 3 Part II examines the Lotus decision and the
"privileged use" scheme suggested by Judge Boudin in his concur-
rence and analyzes the potential benefits and disadvantages of such
a system.3 4 Part III argues that Judge Boudin's suggestion is a viable
alternative for computer software copyright protection because it
provides incentives for innovation, it fosters competition while
preserving compatibility, and it prevents monopolization by the initial
entrant into the market.35 This Comment concludes that courts
should take a long look at the "privileged use" idea and at the
Paperback Software International: Broad Copyright Protection for User Interfaces Ignores the Software
Industry's Trend Toward Standardization, 52 U. Prrr. L REV. 689, 692 (1991) (advocating benefits
of standardization). If the non-literal aspects (for example, screen presentation) of a new
program are compatible with an established program, then users will be able to move to the new
program (if it is considered better than the old program) without much additional training. See
id. at 693. Advocates of standardization argue that strong copyright protection for non-literal
aspects of computer software prevents standardization because competitors of a copyrighted
program must make their programs sufficiently different to avoid copyright infringement
liability. See infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text (describing arguments for standardization
in computer software industry).
29. See Lewis, supra note 28, at 697.
30. See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (discussingJudge Boudin's alternative to
copyrighting computer software).
31. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin,J., concurring) (describing plan for limited licensing
of Lotus). For a discussion of the many arguments both for and against compulsory licensing,
see infra notes 197-219 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (examiningJudge Boudin's proposal for
new software copyright protection analysis).
33. See infra notes 45-166 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving software
copyright protection and antitrust principles).
34. See infra notes 167-232 and accompanying text (examiningJudge Boudin's proposal for
.privileged use" scheme of software copyright protection).
35. See infra notes 233-65 and accompanying text (examining advantages of "privileged use"
as mechanism for software copyright protection).
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benefits it would confer as an alternative to the current computer
software copyright system.3"
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG COMPUTER
SOFrwARE, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND COMPETITION
A. Computer Terminology Introduction
A computer program3 7 consists of both literal and non-literal
aspects.3 8 The term "literal aspects" refers to the code that makes up
the program. 9 There are two types of code: the source code and
the object code.40 The "source code" is what a computer program-
mer creates using a computer language that he or she understands.4
The source code then is translated into "object code," a language that
the computer understands.42
The non-literal aspects of a computer program are those portions
of the program other than the source codes and object codes.43 The
non-literal aspects include the overall organization of a program, the
structure of a program's on-screen command system, the program's
flow charts, and the screen presentation. 4' This Comment focuses
on the debate over the copyrightability of the non-literal aspects of
computer software.
B. Introduction to Copyright Law
Although the traditional basis for protection under American
copyright law is found in the Constitution,'5 the Copyright Act of
1976, as amended, sets forth the subject matter protected under
current copyright law.46 The literal aspects of computer software
traditionally have fallen within the "literary works" section of the
36. See infra Part III (advocating "privileged use" as viable alternative to current copyright
protection of computer software).
37. As noted earlier, throughout this Comment, the terms "program" and "software" are
used interchangeably.
38. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 189.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See i
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.; see also supra note 4 (discussing differences between literal and non-literal aspects
of computer software).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (granting Congress power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (setting forth list ofprotectable subject matter); see also supra
notes 2-3, 5 (explaining relevant provisions of Copyright Act).
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Copyright Act.47 The law is unclear, however, with respect to copy-
right protection for non-literal aspects of computer software.
The traditional rule used to determine what portions of a work are
copyrightable is known as the "idea/expression" dichotomy.4"
Copyright law does not protect ideas; it protects the expressions of
ideas. Copyright protection is not, however, limitless. The doctrines
of "merger" or seines afaire can diminish the extent of protection the
law provides for a particular work.49 Both of these limiting princi-
ples have been applied to computer software.5
C. Computer Software Copyright Cases
The dispute in the courts regarding the proper degree of copyright
protection for computer programs centers on the non-literal aspects
of the software.5" To evaluate the proposal set forth by Judge
Boudin, it is necessary to understand the evolution of software
copyright protection. The following cases illustrate the development
of copyright protection for the non-literal aspects of computer
software.
47. See supra note 2 (listing works categorized as "literary works") and supra note 5 (noting
legislative history of Copyright Act of 1976 that added computer software to literary works
section).
48. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. 37, 53-54 (D. Mass. 1990)
(describing idea/expression doctrine). Copyright law protects the expression in a work but not
the idea behind the expression. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that
copyright law protects description of accounting method but not idea of specific kind of
accounting method). The courts have had a difficult time in applying the idea/expression
dichotomy. SeeVerdesca, supra note 1, at 1051 n.50 (citing cases in which courts struggled to
apply doctrine). The problem lies in defining the idea and then in differentiating between the
idea and the expression of that idea. See id. at 1052.
49. According to the doctrine of merger, an expression is not copyrightable if it is one of
a limited number of ways of expressing a particular idea. See Paperback Soflware, 740 F. Supp. at
58-59. However, if there are numerous other ways of expressing an idea, each expression is
afforded copyright protection. See id.
Schnes t faire is related closely to merger. Sches t faire refers to incidents, characters or
settings which, because they are essential to the treatment of a given topic and are therefore
likely to recur in later treatments of the same topic, are uncopyrightable. See id, at 59. For a
discussion of merger and schnes &tfair see Larvick, supra note 4, at 191.
50. See, e.g.,Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th
Cir. 1989) (noting that merger and scnes afaire apply to computer software); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1021, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that many
features ofApple's program are uncopyrightable because item's expression merges with its idea),
afld in part, rev'd in part 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995);
Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (describing
scbes tfaire in computer software copyright case).
51. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing consistent holdings that literal
aspects of computer software are copyrightable and division in courts regarding non-literal
aspects of software).
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1. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.
The Third Circuit was the first appellate court to confront squarely
the issue of the copyrightability of the non-literal aspects of computer
software in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc..52
Whelan had developed a computer program forJaslow to manage and
organize its dental laboratory records."3 Later, Jaslow developed a
similar program on its own."4 Whelan alleged thatJaslow's program
was based on its program and filed suit for copyright infringement.
55
After noting that copyright protection extends to the literal aspects
of the computer program,56 the district court held that Jaslow's
program did not copy Whelan's source code or object code.57 The
district court then examined the non-literal aspects of the software
and found substantial similarity between the overall structure of the
two programs," which led it to hold that Jaslow had infringed
Whelan's copyright.5 9
The Third Circuit, utilizing the idea/expression test,' concluded
(1) that the purpose of the Whelan program was to assist in the
operations of a dental laboratory; and (2) that copyright law protected
the particular way in which the program expressed that purpose.61
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court decision, holding for the
first time that copyright law extends beyond the literal aspect of a
program.6
2
2. Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International,63 Lotus
brought suit against Paperback Software International alleging that
Paperback's spreadsheet "VP Planner" infringed Lotus' spreadsheet
"1-2-3."1 As in Whelan, the issue in Paperback Software was the
52. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
53. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1225-26.
54. See id. at 1226.
55. See id. at 1227.
56. See supra note 6 (discussing case law establishing copyrightability of literal aspects of
computer programs).
57. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1229.
60. The court in Whelan held that the purpose of a program is its idea; everything that is
not a part of the program's purpose is an expression that is protectable by copyright law. See
id. at 1238.
61. Seek.
62. See id. at 1248.
63. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
64. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 42 (D. Mass. 1990).
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copyrightability of the non-literal aspects of Lotus' program, namely
its screen display.65
The court set forth a three step test to determine the copyright-
ability of the non-literal aspects of a computer program.6 First,
relying on the idea/expression distinction, a court must determine a
program's idea and distinguish it from the program's expression of
that idea.67 Second, once the "idea" is identified, a court must
analyze the elements of a program's expression to determine if they
are essential to the expression of the idea or if they are one of only
a few ways of expressing the idea.' Third, a court must decide
whether the elements of expression that are essential to the idea are
a "substantial" part of the copyrightable work.69 In other words, to
be copyrightable, a particular element of expression in a program
must be essential to the program.7"
Judge Keeton, writing for the majority in Paperback Software, found
that both programs at issue embodied the idea of an electronic
spreadsheet.7 Next, Judge Keeton found that both the "rotated L"
layout of the spreadsheet and the use of the "/" key to access the
menu merged with the idea of a spreadsheet and were not copyright-
able.72 Judge Keeton did conclude, however, that Lotus' particular
expression of a spreadsheet menu did not merge with the idea
because it was merely one of a number of ways of expressing the idea
of an electronic spreadsheet. 3 Finally, Judge Keeton decided that
Lotus' menu command structure met the third step of his test
because the menu structure was a unique feature that made "1-2-8"
extremely popular.74 Having found that "1-2-3" met all three parts
of its test for copyrightability, the court thus held that Lotus' menu
command structure was copyrightable.75
Judge Keeton held, as did the Third Circuit in Whelan, that a
computer program embodies only one idea and that all other
65. See id. at 45-46.
66. See id. at 60-61.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 61. Thus, in the second step the court applies the merger and scnes tifaire
doctrines to the program to determine which aspects are copyrightable. See supra notes 49-50
and accompanying text (discussing application of merger and ednes afaire doctrines to copyright
cases).
69. See Paperback Softwar;4 740 F. Supp. at 61.
70. Judge Keeton noted that the third step is not necessarily an exclusively quantitative
determination, but is qualitative as well. See id.
71. See id. at 65.
72. See id. at 66.
73. See id. at 67-68.
74. See id. at 68.
75. See id.
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elements of a program are expressions of that idea.76  The Second
Circuit, however, rejected the notion that a program can consist of
only one idea, and it formulated a new test for determining the
copyrightability of computer software in ComputerAssociates Internation-
al, Inc. v. Altai, InC.7 7 This new analysis results in significantly less
copyright protection for computer software than the previous tests
used in Whelan and Paperback Software.
3. Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.
In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., the Second
Circuit rejected the test for copyrightability set forth in Whelan and
formulated its own test.78 At issue in Altai was a job scheduling
program (ADAPTER) owned by Computer Associates ("CA").
Claude F Arney III, an employee of CA, left the company for a
position at Altai.8" When he left, Arney took copies of ADAPTER
with him and copied approximately thirty percent of it into a new
program called OSCAR.81 CA eventually learned that Altai had
misappropriated parts of its ADAPTER program for Altai's OSCAR
program, 2 and filed suit against Altai claiming copyright infringe-
ment.
83
The Second Circuit discussed the Whelan test and rejected the
notion that a computer program can embody only one idea.84
Instead, the court found that a single program may contain several
different ideas.85 To determine what parts of the program are
protectable, the program first must be broken down into its "constitu-
76. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir. 1986)
(noting that purpose of Whelan program was to assist in daily operations of dental laboratory);
Paperback Software 740 F. Supp. at 65 (stating that "idea" embodied in Lotus program was that
of electronic spreadsheet).
77. 982 F.2d 693, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1992).
78. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1992).
79. See id. at 698. A job scheduling program is designed to create a schedule for a
mainframe computer, thereby telling the computer the order in which to perform certain tasks.
See id.
80. See id. at 699.
81. See i. at 699-700.
82. See id. Altai was unaware that Arney was copying ADAPTER into the new program
OSCAR. See id. When Altai discovered the copying, it immediately created a new version of
OSCAR without using the code from ADAPTER. See it. This new version, OSCAR 3.5, was sent
to all of Altai's customers as a replacement for the previous OSCAR version (OSCAR 3.4). See
i. At trial, Altai conceded that it had copied ADAPTER into OSCAR 3.4 but not into OSCAR
3.5. See i&! at 701. The trial court found that Altai did not infringe ADAPTER in writing OSCAR
3.5, and Computer Associates appealed this holding to the Second Circuit. See it.
83. Seeid.
84. See idt. at 705-06.
85. See id. at 706.
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ent structural parts," a step the court called "abstraction."86 In the
next step, "filtration," a court examines the constituent parts to sift
out all unprotectable material.87 In the final step, "comparison," a
court compares any elements found to be protected in the filtration
step to the structure of the allegedly infringing program."8 If any
elements of the infringing program are substantially similar to the
protected elements of the original program, a finding of infringement
is warranted. 9
One commentator criticized the Altai test because, by breaking the
program down into smaller parts, the court fails to see the proverbial
big picture, the overall "look and feel" of the program. In addi-
tion, the test has been criticized as being difficult to apply because
identifring the individual elements of a computer program can be
problematic.91
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the level of copyright protec-
tion for the non-literal aspects of computer software has evolved quite
rapidly during the past decade.92 Although the issue of how much
copyright protection to afford non-literal aspects has been much
debated, courts only recently have confronted a new argument that
copyright owners engaging in anticompetitive practices should lose
copyright protection for their computer programs. The following
section examines this argument and how courts have addressed it.
D. Computer Software Copyright Cases Involving Antitrust Law
Whereas the dispute in the copyright infringement cases discussed
above centered on the degree of copyright protection afforded to
non-literal aspects of computer software, another issue has emerged
in a few recent cases. Defendants in copyright infringement actions
have raised the "copyright misuse" defense to prevent recovery by
copyright owners,9" alleging that copyright owners have engaged in
86. See id.
87. See id. at 707-10. In this step, copyright limiting doctrines such as merger and scdnesfaire are used to filter out the unprotectable elements of the program. See id.; see also supra notes
49-50 and accompanying text (discussing merger and scdnes afaire).
88. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 710-11.
89. See id. at 706.
90. See Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1064 (noting that abstraction test creates risk of
eliminating protection for combination of program's individual elements).
91. See id. at 1057.
92. See supra notes 51-91 and accompanying text (discussing varying levels of copyright
protection for non-literal aspects of computer software).
93. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing lack of universal acceptance
of copyright misuse defense); see also Clapes, supra note 11, at 559, 575 (arguing thatjudiciary's
traditional emphasis on antitrust principles has been biased against intellectual property rights
and should not be used as excuse for depriving rights of software copyright owners); Ramsey
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anticompetitive licensing practices and therefore are not entitled to
copyright protection.94 Courts have differed in their treatment of
the copyright misuse defense in software copyright cases.95
To understand how Judge Boudin's proposal relates to the
anticompetition defense asserted by infringement defendants, it is
necessary to understand how parties in computer software copyright
infringement actions have utilized antitrust law.96 The following
cases illustrate how courts have balanced the anticompetition
arguments of infringement defendants against the enforcement rights
of plaintiff copyright owners.9
7
1. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds
In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,9" the Fourth Circuit confront-
ed these competing considerations and sided with the alleged
infringer.99 Lasercomb licensed its computer assisted die-making
software to Reynolds' employer, Holiday Steel Rule Corporation."°
The licensing agreement contained a clause that forbade the
licensee's developing or assisting in the development of any kind of
computer assisted die-making software. 11 Defendants argued that
this clause constituted "copyright misuse" because it effectively would
stifle any competition in the area of computer assisted die-making
software.1"2 The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that by including
the anticompetitive clause in its licenses, Lasercomb was "using its
Hanna, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyfight Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV.
401, 445 (1994) (opining that application of antitrust analysis in copyright infringement cases
could deter creativity); Toshiko Takenaka, Extending the New Patent Misuse Limitation to Copyright:
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 5 SoF'WARE Lj. 739, 764 (1992) (questioning applicability
of misuse defense to copyright cases). But see Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The
Role of Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1308 (1991)
(advocating use of copyright misuse defense to prevent anticompetitive actions by copyright
owners).
94. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
copyright misuse defense to anticompetitive clauses in plaintiff's licensing agreements);
Takenaka, supra note 93, at 760 (arguing that copyright misuse defense should apply to all
licensing practices).
95. See infra notes 98-125 and accompanying text (examining variousjudicial interpretations
of copyright misuse defense).
96. See infra notes 98-125 and accompanying text (examining cases interpreting antitrust law
in computer software copyright context).
97. See supra note 19 (listing cases that upheld copyright owners' right to enforce their
copyright).
98. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
99. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (holding that anticompetitive language in licensing
agreement that attempted to control competition was misuse of copyright).
100. See id. at 971. The software at issue was a program that assisted in the mechanized
creation of a steel rule die. See id.
101. See id. at 972-73.
102. See id. at 972.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:101
copyright in a manner adverse to the public policy embodied in
copyright law."1 °3
The decision in Lasercomb meant that a copyright owner's right to
license its copyright was limited and subject to judicial review under
an antitrust-like analysis. Not all courts, however, have agreed with
the reasoning in Lasercomb.'° As the following cases demonstrate,
some courts regard the copyright owner's right to enforce its
copyright as paramount, even to the detriment of competition in the
software industry.
2. Corsearch, Inc. v. Thomson & Thomson
The First Circuit addressed the antitrust implications of licensing by
computer software copyright owners in Corsearch, Inc. v. Thomson &
Thomson, °5 although the case was not an infringement action.10 6
Thomson was a vendor of computer trademark database searching
services.107  Thomson licensed its database service to Corsearch,
thereby allowing Corsearch to sell search outputs to its customers. 08
Corsearch later decided that it wanted to offer its own searching
services, so it obtained a copy of Thomson's CD-ROM trademark
database under false pretenses and used that copy to service its
customers." 9 Thomson eventually discovered Corsearch's misappro-
priation of the database and terminated Corsearch's license to
Thomson's on-line service.110
103. See id. at 978. Another question in the copyright misuse debate has been what level of
scrutiny to apply to potentially anticompetitive behavior. Must the conduct of the copyright
owner violate antitrust law or merely some lesser standard? SeeTakenaka, supra note 93, at 746-
47 (noting two views of misuse doctrine, one based on antitrust law and one based on lesser
standard). This question has been answered in different ways. See, e.g., Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at
978 (holding that copyright misuse need not violate antitrust law to be equitable defense to
infringement action); Hanna, supra note 93, at 422 (arguing against use of antitrust law as
guideline in determining existence of copyright misuse). But see Corsearch, Inc. v. Thomson &
Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying antitrust analysis to analyze
defendant's copyright misuse argument); Note, supra note 93, at 1302-03 (suggesting use of
antitrust principles when hearing claims of copyright misuse); Roger Ara, Note, Redefining
Copyright Misuse 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1291, 1307-14 (1981) (recommending that courtsjudge all
copyright misuse claims using antitrust principles).
104. See infra notes 105-25 and accompanying text (examining cases in which antitrust
principles played subordinate role to rights of copyright enforcement).
105. 792 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
106. See Corsearch, 792 F. Supp. at 322-23.
107. See id. at 307-08. On-line trademark searching is used by people who are considering
adopting a new trademark and who want to make sure that others are not using the trademark
already. See id. at 307.
108. Seeid.at3ll.
109. See id. at 314-15. By using the CD-ROM, Corsearch was able to avoid paying at least
$26,000 to Thomson for use of its on-line service. See id. at 315.
110. Seeid.at316.
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Corsearch then filed suit, alleging that Thomson's termination of
the copyright license was an antitrust violation because of Thomson's
monopoly in the trademark database searching industry."' The
court rejected Corsearch's claim that the termination of the license
constituted anticompetitive practices." 2  The court noted that,
under copyright law, the owner of a copyright has a right to license
its copyright and to terminate or limit the use of its property in any
manner it deems appropriate.1 3  The court further stated that
Thomson's copyright did not prevent Corsearch from entering the
trademark searching market; Corsearch was free to create its own
database and to offer its searching services to the market. a4 Thom-
son's termination of the license, therefore, was not an antitrust
violation." 5
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Lasercomb, the First
Circuit's holding in Corsearch permitted restrictive licensing practices
even to the detriment of the copyright owner's competitors." 6 The
question whether a copyright owner could go so far as to refuse to
license its software to any of its competitors, however, remained
unresolved.
3. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.
In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.," 7 the First
Circuit considered the issue of whether Data General's outright
refusal to license its software to Grumman constituted an antitrust
violation."' Data General was a computer manufacturer and
retailer, and Grumman was a third party computer maintenance
company."' Grumman claimed that Data General, by refusing to
license its "ADEX" maintenance software to Grumman, was furthering
its alleged monopoly in the computer maintenance market in
violation of antitrust law.'2° In contrast to Lasercomb and Corsearch,
cases in which the copyright owner's restrictive license was at issue,
this case was concerned with the copyright owner's refusal to license
the copyright at all.
11. See id.
112. See id. at 322-23.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 329.
115. See d. at 322.
116. See id. at 322-23 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28, 130 (1932)).
117. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
118. SeeData Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,1152 (istCir. 1994).
119. See id.
120. See id.
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Although the court noted that refusing to license a copyright might
harm consumers initially by stifling competition, the court found
that the refusal to license a software copyright was "a presumptively
valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers. "122
Thus, in balancing the competing interests of copyright and antitrust
law,123 the court determined that in this context the "economic
incentives fueled by the Copyright Act" outweighed the pro-competi-
tion policies of antitrust law. 24
This finding conflicts with Lasercomb, in which the Fourth Circuit,
concerned about anticompetitive practices, decided that antitrust law
limits a copyright owner's right to enforce its copyright. 21 As the
split between the First and Fourth Circuits demonstrates, courts
disagree on the proper balance to be struck between the rights of
copyright owners and the rights of their competitors regarding
anticompetitive behavior.
E. Monopolization Arguments For and Against Software Copyright
Although some courts have limited the copyright owner's right to
enforce its copyright, some commentators would have courts go even
121. See id. at 1187. Data General argued that its refusal to license may actually benefit
consumers by creating an incentive for competitors to create their own, better products. See id.
at 1184-85. The court seemed to reject this argument by stating, "[B]y no means is a
monopolist's refusal to license a copyright entirely 'pro-competitive' .... Id. at 1185. The
court softened its stance, however, by noting that "some type of presumption (that refusal to
license is a valid business practice] may nevertheless be appropriate." Id.
122. Id. at 1187 (emphasis added). The court based its decision on the concern that
imposing antitrust liability on a copyright owner for refusing to license would frustrate the objec-
tives of the Copyright Act. See id. at 1185-86. In a footnote, the court noted that it did not hold
that an antitrust plaintiff never could rebut this presumption because there may be rare cases
in which imposing antitrust liability would not frustrate the Copyright Act's objectives. See id.
at 1187 n.64. The court did not give any guidance regarding the types of situations in which
the presumption might be rebuttable.
123. The court noted that because the granting of a copyright gives the recipient a limited
monopoly, copyright law can frustrate "'the primary purpose of the antitrust laws-to preserve
competition."' Id, at 1184-85 (quoting SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir.
1981)).
124. Id. at 1187. The court opined that "the Copyright Act tolerates behavior that may harm
both consumers and competitors." Id. at 1184-85. The court cited several cases that discussed
the advantages of granting a copyright monopoly and found these advantages to outweigh the
antitrust considerations. See id.; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991) (stating that primary objective of Copyright Act is "'[t o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts'" (quoting U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 2)); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that granting of copyright
monopoly motivates creative activity of authors and inventors by providing "special reward");
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (recognizing that immediate
effect of copyright law is to reward creative labor by securing fair return for author).
125. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (examining various arguments put forth
in Lasercomb regarding application of antitrust principles to copyright misuse cases).
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further.126  These commentators argue that non-literal aspects of
computer software should be granted minimal, if any, copyright
protection because the granting of a copyright gives the recipient a
"monopoly" over that particular portion of the software industry. 17
This argument parallels the concern of copyright infringers2" that
owners of software copyrights will acquire monopoly power in the
software industry and eliminate competitors. 2 9  By granting only
minimal copyright protection, commentators and copyright infringe-
ment defendants argue, competitors are free to make software
compatible'3s with the copyrighted program, thereby ensuring that
the copyright owner cannot gain a monopoly in the industry. In
Lotus, Judge Boudin expressed these same concerns about monopoli-
zation but suggested an alternative way to create compatibility in the
software industry.13 ' To understand the motivation behind Judge
Boudin's proposal, one must consider the monopolization arguments.
1. Arguments for limited copyright protection for software
The following arguments propose limited or no copyright protec-
tion for non-literal aspects of computer software because of possible
monopolization of the software industry by the copyright recipi-
ent.'32 The following section outlines the three forms of this argu-
ment.
126. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (discussing practical problems of copyright
protection in terms of lack of standardization and software monopolization).
127. These arguments focus on the notion that the utilitarian nature of computer software,
coupled with the "unusual nature" of the software industry, provides protection to a software
developer such that strong copyright protection is not necessary for non-literal aspects of
computer software. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 207-08.
128. See supra Parts I.C.1-3 (discussing computer software cases that examine copyrightability
of non-literal aspects of programs, in light of post-copyright activities of copyright owners).
129. For simplicity, this Comment refers to this group of arguments as the "monopolization"
arguments. Although the cases in Parts I.C.1-3 focus on post-copyright activity by copyright
owners, and the arguments in this section focus on the effects of granting the copyright itself,
the reasoning in both situations is based primarily on antitrust law.
130. Compatibility in the software industry commonly is referred to as "standardization." See
Lewis, supra note 28, at 692-93 (describing benefits of standardization in computer software
industry); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1094 (1989) (noting that first entrant into market could reap benefits
of standardization); Verdesca, supra note 1, at 1076 (arguing against copyright protection for
non-literal aspects of computer software because protection would prevent standardization); see
also infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (describing commentators' concerns regarding
"de facto" monopoly, reflecting desire for industry standardization).
131. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring), afd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam).
132. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 209-10.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSnIY LAw REvIEw [Vol. 45:101
a. Ex post monopoly ("locked in")
The term "ex post monopoly" refers to the situation in which a user
of a copyrighted computer program is "locked in" to that program
because competitors' products are incompatible with the copyrighted
program."' 8 Incompatibility occurs when strong copyright protec-
tion requires competitors to develop software so different from the
copyrighted program that users of the copyrighted program cannot
switch easily to the new program."M After investing a significant
amount of time and training into learning the copyrighted program,
the user often is unwilling and perhaps is unable to shift that
investment to a competing program because of the incompatibili-
ty."s 5 Because users will not change to another product and lose the
time and effort they invested to learn the copyrighted program, the
copyright owner obtains a quasi-monopoly. As a result, users
effectively are "locked in" to the copyrighted program." 6 Limiting
copyright protection for non-literal aspects of computer software can
help prevent such a situation by fostering compatibility in the software
industry, thereby enabling users to switch to a competitor's program
without a large capital investment. 3 7
b. Defacto monopoly
A "de facto" monopoly exists when a software developer introduces
an innovative product to the market.M Because copyright law
protects the literal aspects of a computer program,3 9 competitors
133. See Lewis, supra note 28, at 715 (noting that standardization benefits software users by
avoiding costs associated with learning to use incompatible program); Verdesca, supra note 1,
at 1075-76 (arguing that copyright protection should not extend to non-literal aspects of
computer software because compatibility and standardization in computer industry would not
be possible). But see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 69 (D. Mass.
1990) (holding that desire for standardization cannot transcend authors' rights to limited
monopoly in their works).
134. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 210.
135. See id.
136. See id.; see also Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring) (opining that granting
copyright to Lotus' program will "lock" Lotus users into program); Lewis, supra note 28, at 715
(stating that standardization will lower training costs associated with switching to competing
product); Verdesca, supra note 1, at 1075 (noting that without compatibility, software user is
"locked in" to particular computer program).
137. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 211 (stating that standardization will lower business' costs
for computer training of employees); Verdesca, supra note 1, at 1076 (noting that compatibility
allows users to switch between programs without spending tremendous amounts of time, effort,
and money).
138. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 206-07 (noting that developers enjoy degree of monopoly
power when they first release new product).
139. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing how courts have held literal aspects
of software copyrightable).
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must write an entirely different literal code to avoid infringing the
copyright of the newly released program.' 4° Consequently, there is
a time lag between the release of the first product and the release of
competitors' products. 141 This time lag creates the de facto monop-
oly for the developer who releases its product first." Commenta-
tors argue that copyrighting computer software augments de facto
monopolies by giving copyright owners even greater control over the
software industry, thereby enabling them to engage in monopoly
pricing." Commentators also fear that a de facto monopoly could
give the copyright owner a monopoly over the idea behind the
software, something that copyright law ordinarily does not pro-
tect.'"
c. Uncertainty in the law-"chilling" innovation
Another argument against copyright protection for non-literal
portions of software contends that granting copyright protection
creates uncertainty in the software industry as to what competitors can
and cannot copy." In other words, the unsettled state of the law
regarding copyright protection for non-literal aspects of computer
software "chills" innovation because competitors are unwilling to make
competing products out of fear of infringement suits. 46  Competi-
140. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 207.
141. See id. (noting that developer can exploit this monopoly position by improving its
program, while competitors try to imitate it); Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Oveniew, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1388 (1987) (noting that developers gain market advantage through head
start on competitors). But see Hanna, supra note 93, at 414 (arguing that copyright protection
alone will not ensure market success of product); Note, supra note 93, at 1299 (remarking that
obtaining copyright does not confer economic power).
142. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 207. But see Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2367 (stating
that natural lead time for first developer to release program may not suffice to protect
developer's interests).
143. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 209-10 (expressing concern that developer owning a de
facto monopoly could price many consumers out of market through monopoly pricing); Menell,
supra note 1, at 1094 (same).
144. See Verdesca, supra note 1, at 1077. Note that copyright law protects only expression,
not ideas behind the expression. Seesupranotes 45-50 and accompanying text (introducing legal
basis of copyright law).
145. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 203-04 (noting concern of members of software industry
that they are unsure of "what's OK and what will get [them] sued."); Verdesca, supra note 1, at
1078 (remarking that uncertainty in software industry will impede new innovation).
146. In addition to concern about "chilled" innovation, commentators also are concerned
that strong copyright protection for non-literal aspects of computer software favors wealthy
companies that own the software copyrights. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 204. Larvick argues
that large companies have the most to lose if copyright protection for non-literal aspects is
reduced. See id.
Menell, however, argues that copyright protection is more important for smaller, less
established companies. See Menell, supra note 1, at 1070-71. Menell argues that without
copyright protection, a software developer's profits would be eaten up by competitors who
quickly would introduce competing products. See i&L at 1070. Thus, smaller companies would
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tors are discouraged from creating competing products; consequently,
the copyright owner acquires a quasi-monopoly. Commentators argue
that restricting copyright protection to only the literal aspects of
computer software will allay programmers' concerns because non-
literal infringement often is difficult to determine, whereas infringe-
ment of literal code is readily discernible.'47
2. Arguments for broader software copyright protection
Other commentators and judges advocate strong copyright
protection for the non-literal aspects of computer software. The
following arguments are those conventionally given in response to the
arguments against copyright protection for computer software.
a. Protection for the fruits of software developers' labor
A traditional argument for copyright protection emphasizes that
copyright law protects the fruits of the authors' work.148  If software
developers know their creations will be afforded minimal copyright
protection, thus limiting the possible reward, they will be less willing
to invest the time and money necessary to create new programs. 4 1
not be able to enter the market without an assurance that their innovations would be protected
from competition. See id. at 1070-71. This position was echoed in Lotus Development Corp. v.
Paperback Software International, 740 F. Supp. 37, 75 (D. Mass. 1990). In Paperback Soft war Lotus
(a large, wealthy company) argued that elimination of copyright protection for non-literal
aspects of computer software would have the greatest effect on small developers. See id.
Although the first developer to market would have a head start, once a large well-known
company came on the market with its clone, the small developers would lose the fruits of their
innovations. See id; see also supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (discussing argument that
first developer to market obtains an advantage from being first).
147. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 213 (proposing that copyright law should give minimal
protection to non-literal aspects of computer program). But see Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp.
at 73. Judge Keeton rejected the defendant's argument that because software developers would
like to know what they may copy, there should be a bright line distinction between the literal
and non-literal aspects of computer software. See id. Judge Keeton stated that a judgmental,
evaluative standard is more appropriate, and that Congress could have created a bright-line rule,
but chose not to do so. See id-
148. See William T. McGrath, Copyright Protection for User Interfaces in the Nineties: Of Perilous
Journeys on the Shoulders of Giants, 4 SornVARE LJ. 597, 601 (1991) (arguing that narrow
protection for non-literal aspects of computer software will result in sharing of fruits of
program's popularity by competitors who did not contribute to creation of program); see also
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (noting that primary
effect of copyright law is to secure fair return on author's labor); Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (recognizing that copyright seeks to protect author's creative
labor); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954) (concluding that best way to encourage authors
and inventors is to reward individual effort); Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 75 (stating that
ability of software developers to obtain rewards for their works depends on protection given by
copyright law).
149. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1184 (1st Cir. 1994)
(discussing how copyright law encourages innovation by permitting author to earn monopoly
profits (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 429)); Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 79 (stating that one
objective of copyright law is to give protection to expression, thus encouraging innovation);
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The argument that innovation will be "chilled," therefore, supports
both sides of the debate. 50
b. Merger as a doctrine to prevent monopolization
Although several commentators contend that granting a copyright
for computer software will create a monopoly for the recipient,
copyright law has an inherent mechanism for preventing monopoliza-
tion." The merger doctrine is a copyright limitation that prevents
a copyright owner from gaining a monopoly over a particular
idea.152 When there are a limited number of ways to express an
idea, an expression of that idea cannot be copyrighted.1 53  If,
however, there are an unlimited number of ways of expressing an
idea, then an expression of the idea is copyrightable.'1' Thus, if
there are other ways of expressing an idea, granting a copyright for
one expression does not prevent others from creating their own,
unique expression of the same idea."
Clapes, supra note 11, at 202-03 (arguing that non-literal aspects of computer software should
be accorded strong copyright protection to foster innovation and progress); Larvick, supra note
4, at 206 (noting that software companies will be less inclined to innovate if their works are
unprotected).
150. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing how strong copyright
protection for non-literal aspects of computer software will chill innovation).
151. See supra notes 98-125 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that copyright
protection for computer software will grant monopoly to copyright owner).
152. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing definition of merger and its
application to computer software).
153. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the topic necessarily
requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit
copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of
forms, could exhaust all possibility of future use of the substance. In such circum-
stances it does not seem accurate to say that any particular form of expression comes
from the subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the subject matter would
be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize
copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.
Id. (citations omitted).
154. See Paperback Software 740 F. Supp. at 59. Judge Keeton relied on this concept in his
decision that the Lotus spreadsheet was copyrightable. See id. at 67-68. He noted that because
there were an unlimited number of ways of expressing the idea of an electronic spreadsheet, the
particular expression chosen by Lotus was copyrightable. See id.
155. The Paperback Software decision also stated that strong copyright protection will prevent
programmers from borrowing and improving on ideas from other programmers as is done
traditionally in the software industry. See id. at 77. This argument has come to be known as "On
the Shoulders of Giants" ("OTSOG"), meaning that innovation only comes when programmers
rely on the creations of those coming before them. See id. Judge Keeton rejected this argument
as well, noting that programmers are free to borrow the idea of an electronic spreadsheet, as
it is not protected by copyright law, but they cannot borrow Lotus' chosen expression of that
idea. See id. at 78.
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c. Lead time is inadequate for computer software
The argument that software developers who are first to market a
program benefit from their "head start" has met with some criti-
cism.1"' Professor Samuelson notes that the "lead time" contention
is inapplicable to computer software because "information products,
such as computer software, bear so much of the technical know-how
required to make them on or near the surface of the product."'57
For this reason, computer software needs legal protection to safeguard
the "know-how" contained therein.5
d. Judge Keeton's arguments in Paperback Software
In Paperback Software,'59 Judge Keeton addressed several of the
above outlined arguments against copyright protection for computer
software." Judge Keeton was strongly opposed to the "de facto"
monopoly argument, 16 1 which he summarily dismissed.'62  He
opined that such an argument "flipped copyright on its head" and was
"iperverse." '63
Judge Keeton also considered Paperback's argument in favor of a
bright-line rule that would limit software copyright protection to only
its literal aspects and thereby enable computer programmers to
determine readily if they are infringing a copyrighted program.'6
He noted that the desire for certainty in the law is not unique to
copyright law," but that bright-line rules, because they permit little
or no discretion, often fail to accommodate conflicting interests such
as those present in Paperback Software.166
156. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (discussing benefit of "lead time").
157. See Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2367 (explaining how traditional lead time is not
applicable to computer software).
158. See id. at 2367-68; see also Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 75 (noting that competitors
can create a copy of a computer program "fairly promptly" once it is released on the market).
This theory is in direct conflict with those of commentators who argue that strong copyright
protection is not necessary for computer software because of the lead time that first-comers
enjoy when entering the software market. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 206-07 (noting benefit
of time lag between release of software product and competitors being able to clone product).
159. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
160. Paperback Software 740 F. Supp. at 71-79.
161. See id. at 77-79.
162. See id. at 37, 79.
163. Seeid.
164. See id. at 73.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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II. LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. BORLAAD INTERNATIONAL
In addition to the ever-changing debate regarding copyright
protection for non-literal aspects of software, the question concerning
the interaction of antitrust law and copyright law remained unresolved
when the First Circuit heard oral arguments on October 6, 1994, in
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International167 The decision the
court handed down on March 9, 1995, drastically changed the amount
of copyright protection afforded to non-literal aspects of computer
software.
A. The Majority Opinion
The only issue in Lotus was whether the menu command hierarchy
of Lotus' "1-2-3" spreadsheet was copyrightable.'" The First Circuit
began by rejecting the abstraction test set forth by the Second Circuit
in Altai.'69 The First Circuit deemed the abstraction test "mislead-
ing," reasoning that the analysis encourages courts to find a basic level
of copyrightable subject matter in a particular program. 7 ° The
court further noted that the abstraction test "obscures" the more
central question of whether Lotus' menu structure could be copyright-
ed at all.' 7'
167. 49 F.3d 807 (lst Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 807 (1996) (per
curiam).
168. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995). Lotus filed suit
against Borland in the District of Massachusetts only four days after Judge Keeton's favorable
opinion in Paperback Soflware See id at 810. Three days earlier, Borland had filed a declaratory
action against Lotus in the Northern District of California, seeking ajudgment of non-infringe-
ment. See id. The district court in California dismissed Borland's declaratoryjudgment action
in favor of the suit in Massachusetts. See id. After numerous motions for summary judgment
from both sides, Judge Keeton (the judge in Paperback Software) granted partial summary
judgment for Lotus, holding that Lotus' menu structure was copyrightable. See id. On appeal,
Borland conceded that Lotus' copyright was valid and that Borland had copied Lotus' menu
structure. See id. at 813. Thus, the only remaining issue was whether the menu structure was
copyrightable. See i&.
169. Seesupra notes 78-91 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for replacing Altai test).
170. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
171. See id. The court seemed from the outset to have decided that Lotus' menu structure
was not copyrightable. By dismissing the Altai test, the court ignored several cases (including
Altaiitself) that agreed that the purpose of the abstraction test wasto determine copyrightability.
See, e.g., Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1343-44 (5th Cir.
1994) (adopting abstraction test); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527,
536 n.19 (5th Cir. 1994) (using abstraction test for non-literal aspects); Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993) (approving Altai abstraction test for
determination of copyrightability of software menu); Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support
Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1489-91 (10th Cir. 1993) (using Altai test for software); Mitek Holdings,
Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., Inc., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1577-78 (S.D. Fa. 1994) (applying Altai test);
Cognotec Servs., Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 862 F. Supp. 45,49-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(relying on abstraction test to decide copyrightability of foreign currency exchange computer
program); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1993),
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The court next turned to the question of whether Lotus' menu
structure was copyrightable and decided that it was not.'72 In lieu
of the abstraction test, the court held that the Lotus menu structure
was a "method of operation" and thus not copyrightable under
current copyright law. 7 Notably, the court ignored the congressio-
nal mandate that computer programs be considered "literary
works."174  The First Circuit's conclusion thus decidedly favors
companies that make their living by cloning other, successful pro-
grams.
Apparently, the monopolization arguments presented in amicus
briefs filed on behalf of Borland heavily swayed the First Circuit
panel. 7 In particular, the court relied on the compatibility argu-
ment,176 labeling "absurd" the notion that users would have to
perform the same function differently in various computer programs
if Lotus' menu were copyrightable. 7 Additionally, the court noted
that users would be unable to transfer macros from one program to
another.173
aff'dl 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995) (following abstraction
test).
172. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
173. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)).
174. See supra note 5 (discussing legislative history of Copyright Act leading to categorization
of computer programs as literary works). Items that are considered useful articles are
traditionally given less copyright protection than literary works. See also Anthony L. Clapes &
Jennifer M. Daniels, Lotus v. Borland: Nightmare on Milk Street?, 12 COMPUTER LAW. 16, 18
(1995) (noting that Lotus decision reduced already minimal copyright protection for computer
software).
Even those courts that have held computer software to be a useful article and thus entitled
to less protection gave more copyright protection than did the court in Lotus. See Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), afftd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). In Appl, the district court dissected Apple's
program into individual aspects and held that virtually all of them were unprotectable. See id.
at 1027-47. It noted, similar to the court in Lotus, that "an article which has 'any intrinsic
utilitarian function' can be denied copyright protection except to the extent that its artistic
features can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art."
Id. at 1023 (quoting Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1993)). The
court then concluded that Apple's user interface was a useful article because it was intended to
assist users in interacting with the computer. See id The similarity between the reasoning in
Apple (purpose of user interface is to help users access the computer) and Lotus (purpose of
menu in Lotus' program is to give users access to the program) is striking. In both cases, the
courts ignored the congressional mandate that computer programs are literary works and
instead afforded computer software little or no copyright protection.
175. See Clapes, supra note 11, at 555.
176. See supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text (describing various monopolization
arguments against copyright protection for computer software).
177. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818.
178. See id. A macro is a command given to a computer program that represents a sequence
of operations to be performed by the computer. Many computer programs create or allow users
to create macros that can be used only within the program in which they are created. A macro
created in one program will not work in another computer program unless the programs are
compatible. See id at 809; Howard C. Anawalt, Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
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B. Concurrence by Judge Boudin
Judge Boudin, in his concurring opinion, echoed the First Circuit's
concern over the antitrust ramifications of according copyright
protection to non-literal aspects of computer software. 79 He noted
that the importance of the case, as well as his slightly different analysis
of the problem, prompted him to write separately.1 80 Lamenting
that "applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling
a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit,"'8 ' Judge Boudin
proffered a novel solution to the computer software copyright
problem.
1. Judge Boudin's antitrust concerns
Like the majority in Lotus, Judge Boudin was influenced consider-
ably by the monopolization arguments. He stated that if Lotus were
granted a copyright on its menu structure, users would be "locked in"
to Lotus' program. 82 He further noted that Lotus' "1-2-3" spread-
sheet represented the "de facto" standard in the spreadsheet
industry. a Because Lotus already had reaped a substantial reward
for being first,"M Judge Boudin reasoned, its competitors should be
allowed to enable Lotus customers to switch to their programs,
assuming that the competitive products were superior to Lotus'
products.' a Accordingly, Judge Boudin concluded that the question
was not whether Borland's claim should succeed, but "on what
basis.""8 6 Instead of eliminating copyright protection for non-literal
International, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) Part One: Borland and the Blizzard of '96, 12 SANTA CLARA
Comp. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 490 (1996).
179. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 819-20 (Boudin,J., concurring) (stating that misapplication results
when copyright law is applied to computer programs because substance of programs is non-
literal, and protection may limit public access).
180. See id. at 819 (Boudin, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 820 (BoudinJ., concurring).
182. See id. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring).
183. See id. (Boudin,J., concurring).
184. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (describing "lead time" argument).
185. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin,J., concurring). Judge Boudin noted that if Borland's
product is not better than Lotus', Lotus customers will not switch to Borland. See id. This begs
the question of whether Borland should be allowed to appropriate the successful aspects of
Lotus' program, make a few changes, and then call it a "better" product. Without any legal
protection for the Lotus program, second comers such as Borland will be able to do just that.
In addition, the "lead time" argument will not apply in every case so that the justification for
allowing competitors to appropriate aspects of successful software notably will be absent in many
cases. See Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2367 (explaining why computer software innovation
is different from traditional technical products).
186. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (BoudinJ., concurring).
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aspects of software as the majority did, Judge Boudin suggested an
alternative. 8 7
2. Judge Boudin suggests another solution-"privileged use"
Judge Boudin regarded Borland's use of Lotus' menu structure a
"privileged use" because he believed that Borland sought to make its
program compatible with Lotus' program.1" In other words,
Borland was trying merely to give Lotus users the ability to transfer
the investment they made in learning Lotus' menu structure to
Borland's program.' 9 Judge Boudin explained that privileged use
would differ significantly from the "method of operation" analysis."9
Under the method of operation analysis, non-literal aspects are
afforded no copyright protection, thereby enabling competitors to
copy those aspects at will. 9' Under the privileged use doctrine,
however, non-literal aspects are afforded copyright protection insofar
as competitors simply cannot copy those aspects without improving
upon them.'92 Thus, in order to avail itself of the privileged use
exception, a competitor of a copyright owner would have to add
something of its own to the copyrighted product so that the finder of
fact considers its program "better" than the copyrighted product.9 3
C. Privileged Use Is Essentially a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme
The privileged use scheme proposed by Judge Boudin bears
significant resemblance to compulsory licensing. Compulsory
licensing would require a copyright owner to license its copyright to
competitors in exchange for some type of fixed royalty."9 Similarly,
under the privileged use doctrine, copyright owners would be
required to allow competitors to copy some non-literal aspects of the
187. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring). Judge Boudin paid lip service to the majority's
conclusion, calling it a "defensible position." Id
188. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring).
189. See i&L (Boudin,J., concurring). Judge Boudin was concerned with the idea of program
users being locked into one program because competitors are prevented from creating
compatible software due to copyright protection.
190. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring).
191. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring).
192. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring).
193. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring). Judge Boudin acknowledged that this requirement
would add confusion to the test because the factfinder would have to determine whether a
program was "better" than the copyrighted program it emulated. See i. (Boudin, J.,
concurring). He also noted that privileged use would entail "a host of administrative problems"
and would make it more difficult for potential infringers to predict how courts decide their
cases. Id. at 821-22 (Boudin,J., concurring).
194. See Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1066 (explaining how fear of music recording monopoly
led to first compulsory licensing scheme).
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copyrighted software so long as the competitor's motive was to create
compatibility between its program and the copyrighted program.
Although Judge Boudin is not the first to suggest a compulsory
licensing scheme, 95 his notion of privileged use differs in that it
would apply only when the licensee's motive was to ensure compatibil-
ity between its program and the licensor's.196 To analyze the merits
ofJudge Boudin's privileged use doctrine, several arguments for and
against compulsory licensing are set forth below.
1. Arguments for compulsory licensing
There are numerous arguments in favor of a compulsory licensing
scheme for computer software copyrights. One commentator asserts
that the primary rationale for imposing a compulsory licensing
scheme on the software industry is the desire to transfer wealth from
a competitor (who copied the copyrighted program to create compati-
bility) to the copyright owner.'97 Judge Boudin sought to accom-
plish the same goal -with his privileged use suggestion. 98
A compulsory licensing scheme also would reduce the cost for
potential licensees to locate certain information such as the owner of
the license, the availability of a license, and the potential cost of a
license." This would encourage licensees to seek out copyright
owners, thus increasing the potential number of software licenses and
195. See, e.g., iU. at 1067 (advocating use of compulsory licensing for computer software
copyrights); Paul Durdik, Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use Defense to Software Copyright Infringement,
34JURIMErRIcSJ. 451, 469 (1994) (suggesting compulsory licensing as alternative to enjoining
reverse engineering); Lyons, supra note 8, at 96-97 (noting that compulsory licensing is one
possible solution for problem of legal protection for computer software); HeatherJ. Meeker,
Multimedia and Copyright, 20 RUTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 375, 409-10 (1994) (supporting
compulsory licensing for computer software copyrights); Meneli, supra note 1, at 1065
(discussing benefits of compulsory licensing scheme); Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the
Limitations of Copyright Law: An Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyight Legislation in an Era
of Rapid Technological Change, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 307, 331-32 (1989) (describing aspects of
compulsory licensing scheme); Ralph Oman, The Compulsory License Redux Will it Survive in a
Changing MarketplaceF, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 37, 40-48 (1986) (debating pros and cons
of compulsory licensing plan).
196. Those who advocate compulsory licensing schemes generally do not differentiate
between instances when the copying is for compatibility purposes and when it is not. See
Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1066-68 (comparing compulsory licensing to player piano rolls that
allow pianos to play a musical composition automatically).
197. See Durdik, supra note 195, at 469. Despite this benefit of compulsory licensing, Durdik
concludes that compulsory licensing is unnecessary in the computer software context. See id.
198. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 819, 821 (BoudinJ., concurring).
199. See Meeker, supra note 195, at 409-10; see also Menell, supra note 1, at 1066-67 (arguing
that compulsory licensing system would prevent needless spending by competitors to copy
program that is industry standard).
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reducing transaction costs between copyright owners and licens-
ees.
2 00
Another commentator contends that compulsory licensing would
provide an acceptable reward for the efforts of programmers and
would not unreasonably diminish benefits to consumers. °1 In
addition, compulsory licensing may be necessary when balancing the
interests of copyright owners and consumers becomes untenable.0 2
When technology such as computer software makes absolute rights
under copyright law infeasible, compulsory licensing may be the only
solution. °3
Furthermore, a compulsory licensing scheme would prevent
anticompetitive practices by copyright owners.2" Software copyright
owners who have achieved a large presence in the market are unlikely
to license their products to competitors and risk losing market
share.205  Thus, compulsory licensing would ensure that other
companies are able to enter the market and compete with the
copyright owner. Notably this argument conflicts with precedent,
which holds that a copyright owner can refuse absolutely to license a
copyright.0 6 The competing interest of the copyright owners in
enforcing their copyrights again clashes with the interests of consum-
ers and of the software industry in fostering competition and innova-
tion.2 0
7
200. See Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1068. Dobalian notes that a similar rationale motivated
Congress to create compulsory licensing schemes for the cable television industry and for use
of secondary cable transmissions. See id; see also Menell, supra note 1, at 1065 (noting that
compulsory licensing scheme would increase access to industry standard computer program
while providing rewards to copyright owners).
201. See Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1067-68.
202. See Mills, supra note 195, at 330.
203. See id. at 332. In addition, compulsory licensing may become necessary when
technology makes enforcement impossible. See id.
204. See Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1068 (stating that copyright owner has little incentive to
license without compulsory licensing); Meeker, supra note 195, at 410 (noting that compulsory
license abolishes copyright owner's most potent weapon-refusal to license); Meneil, supra note
1, at 1365 (touting potential for compulsory licensing to restricting anticompetitive practices of
copyright owners).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36 (discussing benefits to copyright owners who
do not license their software). When a copyright owner has a large share of the market, the
legal protection of the copyright is an effective bar to others who wish to enter the market. See
Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1068. In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International, 740
F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990), Judge Keeton rejected this argument by noting that Microsoft's
Excel spreadsheet program entered the market as a competitor to Lotus' "1-2-3" spreadsheet and
has been commercially successful. See id. at 78. Excel's success, however, probably is more a
result of Microsoft's strong economic position in the software industry before entering the
spreadsheet market. See Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1068.
206. See supra notes 93-125 and accompanying text (reviewing cases that have held for and
against copyright owners).
207. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (discussing friction between refusal to
license and "privileged use").
1996] LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. BORLAND INTERNATIONAL 179
2. Arguments against compulsory licensing
Aside from the proposition that copyright owners are free-to refuse
to license their copyrights," 8 there are more fundamental criticisms
of compulsory licensing that focus on the administration of such a
system. For example, compulsory licensing would create an adminis-
trative burden for the agency in charge of regulating the scheme. 0 9
Deciding which software should be licensed and what fees to charge
the licensees potentially could be complex.210
In addition, compulsory licensing would raise concerns over how
and by whom such a system would be conducted.2 11 Anxiety about
"government control over the conditions of authorship" would result
if a governmental agency regulated compulsory licensing of soft-
ware.21 2  If the system were run privately,213  copyright owners
would retain control over their work and would remain able to receive
compensation for competitors' use of the copyrighted work.214
Finally, as recognized by Judge Boudin, a compulsory licensing
system would be more difficult to administer than the current
system.215 Such a system would impose cost and delay216 and
would make the outcomes of cases difficult to predict,21 7 a problem
that deeply concerns the software industry.218 Moreover, because
the availability of privileged use depends on the licensee's motive,
courts will face the potentially difficult task of determining whether
the licensee intended to make its program compatible with the
208. See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying text (discussing copyright owners' liberty to
limit use of licenses granted).
209. See Lyons, supra note 8, at 97.
210. See id.
211. See infra notes 253-65 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of privileged
use system).
212. See Mills, supra note 195, at 333-34. To avoid any concern about government regulation
of copyrights, Mills recommends using a private agency to oversee the compulsory licensing
arrangement. See id at 336.
213. See infra notes 257-65 and accompanying text (considering benefits of privately-run
compulsory licensing system).
214. See Milis, supra note 195, at 333 (noting that owner's loss of control over work is more
acceptable under private system).
215. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin,J.,
concurring) (remarking that privileged use would create its own problems), affid by an equally
divided Cour4 116 S. Ct 804 (1996) (per curiam).
216. See id. (Boudin, J., concurring).
217. See id. at 822 (Boudin,J., concurring).
218. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing software developers' desire
for certainty regarding what they can and cannot copy).
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copyrighted program or whether it merely sought to copy the
software's non-literal aspects without improving upon them. 19
3. Privileged use versus refusal to license
As noted above, a fundamental conflict exists between a copyright
owner's right under the Copyright Act to protect a copyright by
refusing to license and the software industry's desire to prevent
monopolization and to foster standardization.220 A compulsory
licensing scheme-even a limited one such as the system Judge
Boudin envisions-clearly would run afoul of a copyright owner's
right to refuse to license a copyright. 21 Privileged use would force
copyright owners to license their copyrights on the non-literal aspects
of their software whenever a competitor wanted to copy those aspects
in the name of compatibility.222 Although a copyright owner's right
to protect a copyright is an important consideration, the benefits of
standardization within the software industry are more compelling.
Therefore, this Comment proposes that the courts adopt Judge
Boudin's privileged use doctrine to create a limited compulsory
licensing system for non-literal aspects of computer software only for
the purpose of promoting compatibility only.
4. Privileged use is analogous to "fair use"
The idea of allowing a copyright owner's competitor a privileged
use of copyrighted material resembles the traditional copyright
exception known as "fair use."2" Codified in the Copyright Act of
19764 this exception permitted the copying of copyrighted materi-
219. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 820-21 (Boudin, J., concurring) (inferring from Borland's
introduction of unique user interface and adoption of Lotus' menu only "as a fall-back option"
that Borland intended to am-act old Lotus customers by ensuring compatibility).
220. See supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text (discussing how standardization and
monopolization are concerns of software industry).
221. SeeData Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that copyright owner's absolute refusal to license its software copyright is "presumptive-
ly valid"). Two of the three judges on the panel in Data General also were on the panel in Lotus.
In Data General, a copyright infringement case focusing more on antitrust law, the panel held
that the refusal to license was valid even though it obviously was an anticompetitive practice, but
in Lotus, a pure copyright infringement case, the panel was concerned with Lotus' ability to
monopolize the software market by using its copyright. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818 (noting that
pimary goal of copyright law is to advance society, not to benefit developers). The court held
that Lotus' spreadsheet menu was not copyrightable. See id. at 819. In Data General, actual
anticompetitive practices were ruled valid, see 36 F.3d at 1187-88, whereas in Lotus, the possibility
of a monopoly caused the court to deny valuable copyright protection. See 49 F.Sd at 818.
These cases were decided only six months apart.
222. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring).
223. See id. (Boudin,J., concurring) (recognizing similarity between privileged use and fair
use).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codifying exception to exclusive copyright rights).
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als under certain circumstances. Examples of fair use include the
production of copies "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching[,] ... scholarship, [and] research."2 A person
who copies a copyrighted work for one of these purposes is not
subject to suit under copyright law. In this respect, fair use is similar
to privileged use. A competitor can copy portions of copyrighted
computer software under the privileged use doctrine without
incurring liability so long as the competitor copies only to ensure
compatibility between its program and the copyrighted software and
compensates the copyright owner accordingly.226 Thus, under both
the fair use and the privileged use exceptions, copying a copyrighted
work is permitted for certain, limited purposes.
Fair use differs from privileged use, however, with regard to the
analysis applied in determining whether a given instance of copyright
infringement falls within the exception. Congress has instructed
courts to examine four factors to decide if a particular use of a copy-
righted work constitutes fair use:
(1) [T]he purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. 27
Some courts regard the first factor as dispositive, holding that
commercial use is presumptively unfair.22 1 Privileged use, in the
context of the computer software industry, almost always would be for
a commercial purpose and therefore would not qualify as traditional
fair use. In his concurrence in Lotus, Judge Boudin acknowledged the
presumption that the fair use exception is "unavailable" when the use
is commercial in nature but noted that "'presumptively' does not
mean 'always.' 229 Moreover, courts have observed recently that the
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 188.93 and accompanying text (defining privileged use).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4).
228. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1398 (N.D. Cal.) (relying on
presumption that commercial use is unfair), modifie 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that presumption of unfairness was overcome); see also Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v.
Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that commercial use of copyrighted
work is presumptively unfair), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994) (holding that presumption
does not end judicial analysis of issue).
229. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring), aff'd Zy an equally divided Court 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam).
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commercial nature of a work is only one element to be considered in
the fair use analysis and have held certain commercial uses permissi-
ble under the fair use doctrine.2" Thus, the privileged use of a
copyrighted computer program as contemplated by Judge Boudin
possibly could be considered a "fair" use.
Despite the similarity between the fair use and privileged use
exceptions, the fourth factor considered under the fair use analysis
distinguishes the traditional exception from Judge Boudin's sugges-
tion. The fourth factor addresses the extent to which the use affects
the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.2"' In
the case of privileged use, the market for the copyrighted work is
affected adversely because the ultimate purpose of the privileged use
is to make a product competitive with the copyrighted product. Thus,
Judge Boudin's notion of privileged use is more expansive than the
traditional fair use doctrine.2 32
III. PRIVILEGED USE IS A VIABLE MEANS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
FOR NON-LITERAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
This Comment recommends adoption of the privileged use
doctrine for non-literal aspects of computer software because it
provides several advantages over the alternative of affording no
copyright protection to non-literal features. A limited compulsory
licensing scheme such as privileged use would: (1) promote
standardization in the software industry; (2) provide software
developers with incentives to innovate; (3) furnish compensation to
copyright owners for the use of the non-literal aspects of their works;
(4) foster competition in the software industry; and (5) prevent
monopolization by copyright owners.3 3
230. See Campbel4 114 S. Ct. at 1170-71 (asserting that courts should examine all four
statutory factors); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522 (ruling that statutory factors are not exclusive of one
another).
231. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
232. In Sega, however, the Ninth Circuit held that Accolade's use of Sega's copyrighted
computer program was a fair use. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527-28. Accolade broke down the
computer program in Sega's "Genesis" video game in order to learn how to make its own video
games compatible with Sega's system. See id. at 1514-15. The court held that although Accolade
used Sega's program in order to become a competitor in the video game market, this was not
a bar to a finding of fair use. See id. at 1522. Because Accolade intended to create compatibility
between its games and Sega's system, its use of Sega's copyrighted program was a fair use. See
id. at 1522-23.
Analogizing this reasoning to the privileged use situation, it is possible that privileged use, as
contemplated by Judge Boudin, could be considered fair use. See Triad Sys. Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that use that provides
public benefit by creating compatibility is fair use), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 1015 (1996).
233. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text (describing benefits of privileged use
doctrine).
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A. The Advantages of Privileged Use
1. Promoting standardization in the software industry
A standardized software industry would offer many benefits. The
interest of software consumers in user-friendly programs would be
recognized by creating conventional, well-known ways of using
different computer software.2" In addition, standardization would
lower training costs. Consumers would be able to learn more software
in a shorter time because they readily could transfer their knowledge
between programs.23  Standardization also might increase the
overall number and variety of programs available to consumers." 6
It also would be easier for computer users to transfer files between
different software and among other users.
37
2. Encouraging software innovation
Other benefits arise by limiting the availability of the privileged use
doctrine to situations in which the potential licensee wants to create
compatibility. With respect to software developers, standardization
fosters innovation by allowing programmers to build on pre-existing
standards when creating new software.21 Developers would not
have to start from scratch each time they wished to create a program
and therefore would be more likely to develop new software.239
3. Providing compensation to copyright owners
Although the privileged use doctrine would compel copyright
owners to license their copyrights in certain situations, the owners
would receive compensation for doing so.2" Compulsory licensing
systems are equitable because licensees gain access to the software
only after compensating the licensor.241 Privileged use thus strikes
an acceptable balance between the needs of the software industry and
234. See Lewis, supra note 28, at 715.
235. See id; see also Larvick, supra note 4, at 211 (noting that standardization would lower
training and mobility costs).
236. See Lewis, supra note 28, at 715.
237. See id. at 693.
238. See id. at 716.
239. See id; see also Larvick, supra note 4, at 211 (noting that standardization would lower
development costs by allowing developers to build on existing standards).
240. See Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1067-68 (arguing that compulsory licensing system would
reward software developers adequately); Menell, supra note 1, at 1365 (stating that flexible
compulsory licensing scheme would ensure rewards for software developers).
241. See Mills, supra note 195, at 332.
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those of the copyright owners by ensuring that copyright owners
receive fair compensation for the use of their works.
4. Fostering competition
Standardization resulting from privileged use also would foster
competition in the software industry. Access to copyrighted standards
would enable other companies to enter the software industry because
the standard would serve as a starting point from which the new
company could build." Consequently, the cost of developing new
products would decrease and companies with fewer resources would
be able to enter the market." Without standardization, entry into
the software market is cost-prohibitive for many smaller companies,
thus perpetuating larger companies' hold on the industry.
24
5. Preventing monopolization by copyight owners
By compelling copyright owners to license, privileged use would
hinder copyright owners' efforts to monopolize the software indus-
try.2 45  Although privileged use obviously would prevent copyright
owners from refusing to license their copyrights, owners still would
enjoy a semblance of monopoly power by being the first to release a
particular product.2 46  Privileged use, however, would prevent
software users from being "locked in" to a copyrighted product,
thereby denying the copyright owner an "ex post facto" monopo-
ly.247 Finally, privileged use would eliminate some uncertainty that
plagues members of the software industry. With license in hand,
software developers will know to what extent they can copy the
copyrighted program.
242. See Lewis, supra note 28, at 716.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. SeeDobalian, supra note 3, at 1068 (noting that without compulsory licensing, copyright
owners have little incentive to license use of non-literal aspects of their software); Cole M.
Fauver, Compu/sory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J.
INT'L L & Bus. 666, 677 (1988) (arguing that compulsory licensing would reduce licensor's
enjoyment of monopoly profits); Lyons, supra note 8, at 96-97 (stating that compulsory licensing
would eliminate monopolies on non-literal aspects of computer software).
246. See Larvick, supra note 4, at 209 (stating that first software developer to reach market
enjoys lead time over copiers). But see Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2367 (discrediting lead
time argument as applied to computer software industry because competitors can easily analyze
software data and copy it). For copyright owners to enjoy this lead time fully, the privileged use
scheme probably would have to include some type of time delay before licensees could begin
to apply for licenses.
247. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text (discussing problems associated with ex
post facto monopolies).
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B. What Copyight Standard Should Be Employed?
Adopting a limited compulsory licensing standard does not, of
course, answer the question of how to determine what should be
copyrighted in the first instance. To answer this question, one should
look to the existing analysis set forth in Paperback Software.2"
Although Paperback Software has been criticized for granting too
much protection to the non-literal aspects of computer software,
249
much of this criticism is premised on the notion that strong copyright
protection creates a monopoly for the copyright owner.25  Critics'
fears of monopolization in the software industry are moot if one
considers the Paperback Software standard in light of a compulsory
licensing scheme such as privileged use.25' Strong copyright protec-
tion becomes acceptable in conjunction with the privileged use
doctrine because the software market will have access to non-literal
aspects of the copyrighted program through compulsory licensing. If,
on the other hand, the copyrightability standard is weak, the
copyright owner will have little protection in circumstances in which
privileged use is unavailable; that is, in those instances in which the
copier does not seek compatibility, but wishes merely to exploit the
non-literal aspects of the copyright owner's software. Strong copyright
protection would protect the copyright owner against competitors who
want to copy the program's non-literal aspects for reasons other than
ensuring compatibility, and the privileged use doctrine would ensure
that the copyright owner is compensated when competitors copy the
software's non-literal aspects for purposes of standardization. Thus,
the proper standard for determining the copyrightability of software
under a privileged use system is a test that provides broad copyright
protection for non-literal aspects, such as the test set forth in Paperback
Software.252
248. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990), afjd
by an equally divided Court. 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam); see also supra notes 63-77 and
accompanying text (describing three-step test used to determine copyrightability of non-literal
aspects of computer program).
249. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807,815 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing
limitations of Altai test), affd by an equally divided Cour4 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam);
Dobalian, supra note 3, at 1063-64 (criticizing Paperback Software and Altai tests); Larvick, supra
note 4, at 194 (noting dissatisfaction with test set forth in Paperback Software); Lewis, supra note
28, at 699-701 (reportingjudicial rejection of Paperback Software standard).
250. See supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text (describing arguments against strong
copyright protection based on monopolization concerns).
251. See supra notes 188-219 and accompanying text (considering privileged use as an
alternative to elimination of copyright protection).
252. See Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 59-62 (establishing three-step test to determine
copyrightability of non-literal aspects of computer software).
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C. Implementation of Privileged Use
Before lawmakers implement a system like privileged use, they must
consider how such a system would work. Congress could intervene
and create a compulsory licensing system based on compatibility.
Such systems are not unprecedented. In the Copyright Act of 1976,
Congress created a compulsory licensing system for jukeboxes. 5 s
Jukebox operators were required to pay a fee, set forth in the statute,
in order to play the music contained in their jukeboxes.2 54
Congress could legislate a similar system for computer software to
implement privileged use. A software developer wishing to create a
program compatible with a copyrighted program would be required
to pay a fee to the copyright holder. Once the developer paid the
fee, he or she could borrow the non-literal aspects of the copyrighted
program to write a new program. Under a government-run system,
a government entity would set the appropriate fees and royalties. 55
A privileged use system administered by the government, however,
would raise concerns about excessive "government control over the
conditions of authorship. 2
56
An alternative to a government-run system would be a "market"
system in which private parties address copyright infringement
problems.257 A privately-run system would keep pace better with the
rapid technological advances that characterize the computer software
industry.258  Privately-run, market-based, compulsory licensing
systems, however, have been criticized as inadequate.259
One pragmatic approach is a voluntary licensing system in which
copyright owners could bargain for their own royalties with potential
licensees.26 Voluntary licensing, however, also has been criticized
because it would be difficult for a copyright owner to negotiate with
every potential licensee on an individual basis.261 One commentator
253. See 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).
254. See id. § 116(b) (1); see also Oman, supra note 195, at 41 (noting that noncompliance
with statute is continuing problem).
255. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, created in the Copyright Act of 1976, controls
compulsory licensing royalties in the United States. See id. § 801 (a) (authorizing Librarian of
Congress to establish copyright royalty panels).
256. See Mills, supra note 195, at 333-34 (reporting concern over potentially intrusive
oversight and possible loss of, or sanction against, creative works).
257. See id. at 334.
258. See id. The fact that the system would be run by members of the industry would ensure
that the licensing entity is up to date on any technological changes affecting the market.
259. See id. at 335. Mills notes that market-run systems are prone to unpredictability and thus
are less attractive than government-run systems. See id. at 335-36.
260. See id. at 336.
261. See id.
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has addressed this criticism by recommending that a private agency
administer such a voluntary system.262 The agency would perform
the same function as the government entity in a government-run
system without the concern of excessive government involvement.
26
Although the copyright owner would be free either to contract with
the private agency or to negotiate on an individual basis, 26 the
copyright owner would have to permit privileged use by competitors
interested in creating compatible programs. 26
Of course, Congress could institute a privileged use system that
would not compensate copyright owners at all. It could decide that
standardization in the computer software industry is so important that
copyright owners must allow competitors to duplicate non-literal
aspects of copyrighted software without receiving any fee or royalty.
Copyright owners obviously would oppose this type of system.
Therefore, a privileged use system would have to incorporate a
compensation scheme. Of the possible alternatives, a voluntary
licensing system in which copyright owners either would contract with
a private licensing agency or would negotiate with individual licensees
is the most viable because it avoids government control of works of
authorship and it enables authors to determine the conditions under
which their works are licensed.
CONCLUSION
The debate regarding the degree of copyright protection appropri-
ate for non-literal aspects of computer software continues. Much of
the dispute focuses on the problem of monopolization of the software
market through anticompetitive practices by software copyright
owners. To solve this problem, many commentators, as well as the
First Circuit in Lotus, advocate diminishing (or eliminating altogether)
copyright protection for non-literal features of software so that
copyright owners cannot use copyrights to stifle or eliminate
competition.
Judge Boudin, in his concurrence in Lotus, has suggested permitting
a privileged use of the non-literal aspects of a copyright owner's
software by a competitor seeking to make its program compatible with
the copyrighted software. The competitor would receive a license to
use the non-literal portions of the program and, in exchange, would
262. See id. at 336-37.
263. See id. at 337.
264. See id.
265. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (defining privileged use).
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pay a royalty to the copyright owner. Privileged use thus is a type of
compulsory licensing scheme, limited insofar as it is available only
when the licensee seeks compatibility between his or her program and
the copyrighted program.
A limited compulsory licensing scheme such as privileged use would
create standardization in the software industry, provide incentives to
software developers to innovate, furnish compensation to copyright
owners for use of the non-literal aspects of their works, foster
competition in the software industry, and prevent monopolization by
copyright owners.
Furthermore, the privileged use doctrine, coupled with strong
copyright protection for non-literal aspects of computer software,
would strike an acceptable balance between the interests of copyright
owners and the software industry: copyright owners would receive
compensation and competitors would obtain access to copyrighted
software. This arrangement will serve to benefit software consumers
in the future.
188
